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Abstract: Do big cities exert more power than less populous ones in 
American state legislatures? In many political systems, greater 
representation leads to more policy gains, yet for most of the nation’s 
history, urban advocates have argued that big cities face systematic 
discrimination in statehouses. Drawing on a new historical dataset, spanning 
120 years and thirteen states, we find clear evidence that there is no 
strength in numbers for big-city delegations in state legislatures. District bills
affecting large metropolises fail at much higher rates than bills affecting 
small cities, counties, and villages.  Big cities lose so often because size 
leads to damaging divisions.  We demonstrate that the cities with the largest
delegations—which are more likely to be internally divided—are the most 
frustrated in the legislative process. Demographic differences also matter, 
with cities that have many foreign-born residents, compared with the state 
as a whole, failing at especially high rates. 
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Numbers should matter, when it comes to determining who gets what 
in a legislature. Democracy, at its most basic, demands full and fair 
representation, and political actors push constantly to maximize their share 
of seats.  The greatest compromises at the U.S. constitutional convention all 
revolved around this question, with delegates seeking representational 
advantages for their state or section.  In more recent times, advocates for 
descriptive representation contend that, as members of underrepresented 
groups, more women or African Americans in a legislature are always 
preferable to fewer, though supporters of substantive representation suggest
that this is true only if the numbers promoting the group’s interests are not 
diminished (Swain 1995, Canon 1999, Swers 2002, Tate 2003, Grose 2011; 
Kanthak and Krause 2012).  “Critical mass theory” explicitly argues that 
women will have a greater impact on legislative outcomes when their 
numbers grow (Childs and Krook 2008).  And, in comparative contexts, 
Gamson’s Law holds that “parties forming a coalition government would 
each get a share of portfolios proportional to the seats that each contributed 
to the coalition” (Carroll and Cox 2007, 300; also Gamson 1961).   The 
largest legislative blocs, in short, should have an outsized influence on 
decision-making.
In the realm of state politics, scholars and reformers alike have long 
assumed that gaining more seats in a legislature would be the solution to the
historical frustrations of big cities.  Until the Supreme Court rulings of the 
1960s mandating legislative districts of equal size, malapportionment was 
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routinely cited as a leading explanation for the difficulties cities faced in 
promoting their legislative agendas.  More legislative seats, everyone 
understood, translated to greater influence in the legislative process: the 
proposition has been axiomatic.  “Traditionally, State governments have 
been unsympathetic arenas for cities,” Weir (1996, 24) argued.  “Rural 
interests, vastly overrepresented in State legislatures, have usually 
dominated the political process.”  With big-city delegations artificially 
reduced in size, malapportionment exaggerated rural influence in state 
legislatures, enhancing the ability of rural legislators to block urban 
initiatives (Wells 1939, 111; Baker 1960, 93-94; Banfield and Wilson 1963, 
69-70; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008; Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom 2005, 
734).  The end of malapportionment, ironically, coincided with declining city 
populations.  Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005) examine the challenges 
facing cities in recent years in the legislative process.  “Since the 1960s,” 
they contend, “the political influence of cities in state legislatures has eroded
as cities have lost population and representation” (Weir, Wolman, and 
Swanstrom 2005, 734).  Malapportionment has come and gone, but the 
conviction remains unchallenged that larger legislative delegations should 
strengthen a city’s voice at the state level.
If size has its advantages, that news has not traveled to New York, 
Chicago, or Los Angeles.  For more than a century’s time, leaders of the 
nation’s great cities have rarely celebrated their ability to secure necessary 
legislation in their state capitals, even though they have often sent very 
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large delegations to those capitals.  On the contrary, the great narrative in 
urban politics has been a story of unremitting hostility: despite the great 
number of legislative seats held by big cities, the rural hinterland has 
routinely risen up and frustrated urban initiatives and interfered with urban 
governance (Beard 1912, Wells 1939, Desmond 1955, Baker 1960, Banfield 
and Wilson 1963, Wiebe 1967, Weir 1996).  We seek to unravel the paradox 
that, in the affairs of big cities and American states, there is no strength in 
numbers.
In this article, we examine the link between size and power by focusing
on “district bills” to assess the challenges facing big cities in state 
legislatures.  When cities have complained about legislative interference in 
their affairs—when Boston’s residents chafed at the fact that their police 
commissioner was appointed by the governor (Shefter 1970, 1), when “St. 
Louis was subjected to virtually annual charter revisions by the Missouri 
legislature” (Griffith 1974, 212)—the evidence has always come in the form 
of district bills.  Sometimes called “special legislation,” district bills are 
legislation targeted to a specific locality (or small set of localities).  Because 
cities lack the powers to legislate in many areas on their own behalf (Frug 
1999), they require positive legislation at the state level to pursue a wide 
range of initiatives.  As we discuss elsewhere (Gamm and Kousser 2010), 
district bills include all bills that relate to a specific, identifiable place—
including counties, towns, villages, cities, school districts, parks, airports, 
highways, churches, businesses, water districts, and local institutions.  Only 
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rarely (in 9% of cases) is this a transfer of funds to the local level.  District 
bills do not include the major state health and welfare policies that 
disproportionately benefit urban dwellers.  Almost always, district bills traffic 
not in funds or major programs but in authority, granting the locality the 
ability to conduct its business as its leaders and representatives define that 
business.  One bill in our dataset, for example, authorized the city of New 
York to make loans to members of its teachers’ retirement system (1981 N.Y.
S. 4408), while another made it a crime to possess the “green hide” of a 
raccoon or mink in Red River County, Texas (1941 Texas H. 794). 
Examining passage rates of big-city district bills relative to district bills 
from other places, we find that big-city bills fail at very high rates.  Indeed, 
as we show below, the biggest delegations have the highest failure rates.  
Why is this the case, when more seats leads to more power in so many other
political realms?  We proceed to analyze reasons that big-city bills might face
unusually steep obstacles to passage even when these cities control large 
blocs of seats in state legislatures.  In the analysis, we consider an array of 
explanations: urban-rural hostility, partisan divisions, malapportionment, 
racial or ethnic differences, even the sheer number of bills emanating from 
big-city representatives.  While animus against immigrants seems to explain 
some of the challenges faced by big-city bills—we find that cities with high 
numbers of immigrants (relative to their states) have low passage rates, 
though we cannot prove that this is due to anti-immigrant bias—no factor 
proves more important than the large sizes of urban delegations.  It is not 
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partisanship or rural hostility that explains the high failure rate of big-city 
bills; neither of these variables has explanatory power.  Rather, it is the cities
with the largest legislative delegations that face the greatest hurdles to 
passing their bills.  Size proves a hindrance, we demonstrate, because a 
large delegation is more likely to be internally divided than a smaller 
delegation, muddling cues for others in the chamber.  At least in the realm of
district legislation, ending malapportionment and increasing delegation sizes 
appears to have harmed rather than helped the interests of big cities.
Hostility, Deference, and the Struggle to Pass Big-City 
Bills
Great cities have consistently complained of difficulties in advancing 
their interests at the state level.  Observers through the years have offered 
numerous examples as well as a straightforward explanation of the problem: 
hostility.  In the telling, rural, suburban, exurban, upstate, and downstate 
legislators have joined forces throughout history to block bills sought by 
large cities and to pass legislation antagonistic to the interests of the 
metropolis.  “New York City is pie for the hayseeds,” George Washington 
Plunkitt declared in 1905 (quoted in Riordon 1994, 59, 60).  “Did you ever go
up to Albany from this city with a delegation that wanted anything from the 
Legislature?  No?  Well, don’t.  The hayseeds who run all the committees will 
look at you as if you were a child that didn’t know what it wanted, and will 
tell you in so many words to go home and be good and the Legislature will 
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give you whatever it thinks is good for you.”  In 2008, more than a century 
after Plunkitt’s grievance, David Gantt, a Rochester legislator, used his 
power as committee chairman to block legislation allowing New York City to 
install additional cameras to identify cars violating basic traffic rules.  When 
asked why he would not allow a bill that was favored overwhelmingly by the 
city’s delegation to come to the floor, Gantt responded cryptically, “That’s 
for me to know and you to find out” (“Mr. Gantt Says No” 2008).  In its 
editorial, the New York Times condemned the obstacles that the city faces in 
the state legislature when it seeks bills on its own behalf, observing that “it 
makes no sense for one upstate legislator to strangle progress—and safety—
in New York City.”
That state legislatures are hostile arenas for city interests is a deeply 
rooted belief, grounded in the fact, as Frug (1999) points out, that all 
localities are dependent on the state for authority to pursue a wide range of 
goals.  While small-town representatives have rarely faced obstacles in 
pursuing their agendas, delegates from large cities have viewed the capitol 
as enemy territory.  According to this narrative, rural and suburban 
legislators interfere in urban affairs over the objections of big cities, and they
regularly kill bills sought by urban legislators, stifling a city’s self-defined 
priorities (Beard 1912, Wells 1939, Desmond 1955, Baker 1960, Wiebe 
1967).  The legislative “veto” over urban preferences looms large in the 
literature and in day-to-day criticisms.  “Not only do legislatures interfere 
with the fundamental rights and pettiest details of city affairs,” Beard (1912, 
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32) noted; “their consent is required for some of the most insignificant 
undertakings on the part of municipal governments.”  As Desmond observed 
in 1955 (296), “States strangle local initiative.”
A competing body of research, however, has uncovered little evidence 
of sinister conspiracies driven by rural, suburban, and outstate legislators.  
According to Derge (1958, 1065), “The traditional belief in bitter conflict 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the state legislature 
must be rejected for Illinois and Missouri,” the two states he examined.  In 
fact, bills affecting big cities have typically been introduced in the legislature 
by big-city representatives, as Shefter (1970), Teaford (1984), Allard et al. 
(1998) and Burns et al. (2009) note, and legislators have tended to treat one 
another’s district bills with deference.  “State legislatures have routinely 
deferred to local governments,” Allard et al. (1998, 294, 295-96) found, 
reporting that nearly all of the bills governing Detroit and Boston were 
introduced by state legislators from these cities.  
But this emphasis on deference and on the ability of big-city 
delegations to exercise agenda control has neglected a persistent, 
complementary truth, uncovered on a large scale for the first time in this 
research project: big-city bills fare much worse in state legislatures than bills 
from other cities and towns across the state.  Figure 1, based on data we 
have collected from thirteen states for the period 1880-2000, illustrates our 
basic finding.  The figure examines passage rates for bills introduced into the
lower house of the state legislature, with data collected at twenty-year 
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intervals.  (We see an identical pattern when we look at the number of bills 
that pass both houses and are signed into law by the governor; we provide a 
parallel figure in the online Appendix Figure A1.)  Every bill in our database is
a district bill: each affects a specific locality and is introduced in the 
legislature by someone from that place.  Over time, there is a large, stable 
gap in passage rates between big-city bills—defined here as district bills 
introduced by legislators from cities of at least 100,000 people—and bills 
from smaller places.  Year after year, while most bills affecting smaller 
districts pass, most big-city bills fail.
If deference has characterized state legislative action, then 
documenting and explaining this failure rate is crucial to understanding why 
state legislatures have long been seen as hostile arenas for big cities.  Derge
(1958), Teaford (1984), Allard et al. (1998), and Burns et al. (2009), who 
focus on patterns of deference, do not mention the high failure rate of big-
city bills in their analyses.1  In fact, we are aware of no previous study that 
documents and explains this failure rate.  Our data, however, show that, as 
state legislators seek to advance their district’s agenda at the state level, 
those from the biggest places enter the race handicapped.  Figure 2 draws 
on the same data as Figure 1, but aggregates the data by the size of the 
locality, without regard to time period.  The figure displays data for four 
types of places—localities with fewer than 10,000 people; those with 
populations of 10,000 to 100,000 people; those with populations of 100,000 
to 500,000 people; and cities of at least 500,000.  The pattern confirms the 
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centrality of city size to legislative success.  Larger cities struggle to pass 
bills, when smaller places do not.  The burdens of size grow dramatically 
when cities reach at least 100,000 in population and increase even more for 
cities with populations over 500,000.  Historically, district bills from a small 
or medium-sized city have been twice as likely to pass as bills from cities as 
large as Chicago or New York.  Later in the article, we show that this finding 
is not spurious; it cannot be explained away by differences in bill content, in 
bill authorship, or in a crude bias against the single largest city in a state.  
Large cities do face special burdens in the state legislatures, as scholars and 
urban leaders have contended since the 19th century, and the burdens grow 
with city size.
Barriers to the Success of Big-City Bills
Towns, villages, suburbs, exurbs, even mid-sized cities: 
representatives from all these places expect, as a matter of routine, that 
their district bills will become law in large numbers.  So why is the story 
different when we look at large cities?  We offer five possible explanations.  
The first of these theories is grounded in the dynamics of the legislature 
itself, where habits of deference are facilitated when a local delegation is 
unified and where unity is best achieved when the delegation is small.  The 
theory is that the high failure rates of big-city bills are due to fractiousness 
within that city’s own large delegation, not to animosity from others in the 
state.  Three other theories, and the hypotheses that flow from them, 
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measure rural and suburban hostility in straightforward fashion: hostility 
against cities with large populations, against cities with many immigrants or 
African-American residents, and against cities whose dominant political party
differs from that of the rest of the state.  Finally, we consider the possibility 
that large numbers of big-city bills may explain their relatively low passage 
rates.
The city has a large legislative delegation. Perhaps big cities lost 
as much as they gained in the apportionment revolution of the 1960s.  
Indeed, the discrepancy in passage rates has grown with time.  As Figure 1 
shows, passage rates for big-city bills were lower in 1981 and 1997 than in 
any previous year in the study, and in 1981 passage rates were more than 
twice as high for bills affecting other places in the state than for those 
affecting big cities.  The increased representation of metropolitan interests in
state legislatures—while empowering city residents on an array of statewide 
issues and resulting in fairer transfers of wealth to cities and suburbs—may 
have harmed big-city delegations seeking passage of district bills.
Large delegations have more difficulty speaking with a single voice 
than do small, compact delegations.  “In the case of a small city represented 
by a single legislator in each house, what passes for the will of the entire 
house is actually the will of the particular member,” according to McGoldrick 
(1933, 2).  “His party colleagues stand ready not only to accept his judgment
as to all matters relating solely to his district but to enact it into law.”  The 
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observation that there are costs to increasing a delegation’s size fits with 
patterns seen in congressional studies, including Kanthak and Krause’s 
(2012) work on the representation of minority interests.  Voting “cues” 
(Kingdon 1973) presumably assume special importance in state legislatures, 
as Burns et al. (2009) argue, especially on low-information matters like 
district bills.  Legislators habitually support the district bills of their 
colleagues, but deference becomes impossible when the city’s own 
legislators are at odds.  According to this theory, size itself leads to division—
and division can fatally undermine efforts to persuade others in the 
legislature to support a district bill.  Disagreement within a delegation may 
come from a simple lack of coordination among the members themselves, 
from true conflict over policy or along party lines, or from the difficulty of 
distinguishing bills affecting small parts of a city from those dealing with the 
city as a whole.  
Larger delegations, our data show, are more likely to be internally 
divided, and their bills are less likely to pass.  Drawing on data we present in 
the next section, we consider two measures of delegation cohesion—party 
unity and roll-call votes.  By both measures, as Figure 3 demonstrates, 
delegations grow more divided as they grow larger in size.  One-person 
delegations are, of course, perfectly united on roll calls and in party 
identification.  These measures of cohesion trend downward as delegations 
grow, falling sharply once there are at least 11 legislators in the delegation.  
The largest delegations are most sharply divided along party lines.  Roll-call 
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data, too, suggest greater division as delegation size grows.  While the 
typical bill has passed or failed without a roll-call vote, and while most roll-
call votes have been unanimous, delegation unity on roll calls corrodes 
steadily as delegation size becomes larger.  As Figure 3 shows, not only do 
delegations become more divided as they grow in size, but passage rates fall
dramatically.  The changes in passage rates are smooth and consistent 
across each step of increasing delegation size—from 95% for bills introduced
by one-person delegations to 29% for bills introduced by the largest 
delegations.  Looking only at the roll-call votes, we find that division in the 
delegation predicts higher levels of opposition in the whole chamber (with a 
statistically significant correlation of 0.58).  When a delegation divides, the 
entire floor is more likely to divide.  But we need to look beyond roll-call 
analysis: the vast majority of bills fail because they never come to the floor 
for a vote, and the great majority that come to a vote pass, most of them 
unanimously, without roll calls.  Because we predict that the effect of shifting
from a one-person delegation to a two-person delegation will have a much 
greater impact on the unity and visibility of the group than the shift from a 
51-person to a 52-person delegation, we use the natural log of delegation 
size in our regression models to test this hypothesis.
H1. As the size of the city’s delegation in the legislature (logged) 
increases, passage rates of that city’s district bills will fall, ceteris 
paribus.
The city is big and threatening.  City size alone may be sufficient to
explain why big-city bills fail at high rates.  Especially in states dominated by 
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a very large city, “a bipolarization of attitudes may tend to develop,” V. O. 
Key (1956, 230) wrote in American State Politics.  “The outstate has its 
anxieties about metropolitan domination.”  Sitting in the rural hinterland of a
state—or in the suburban fringe or in another, smaller city—legislators might 
look at the concentration of population and resources in the big city with 
jealousy and concern.  Some cities easily dominated all other places in their 
states.  San Francisco, for example, was home to 27% of all Californians in 
1880, and a majority of all New Yorkers (7.5 million people, or 55% of the 
state) lived in New York City in 1940.  Meanwhile, in other states, even their 
largest cities were tiny.  Walla Walla, Washington, had a population of 3,588 
in 1880, and Burlington, Vermont, had a population of 11,365 that year; even
in 2000, Burlington’s population was 38,889.  We draw on U.S. Census 
Bureau data reported in Gibson and Jung (2005) for cities and in Haines 
(2006, pp. 1-180 to 1-365) for states to compute each city’s percentage of 
the state population, and expect that as it rises, legislative support for its 
bills will fall.
H2. When a city comprises a larger percentage of the state’s 
population, passage rates of that city’s district bills will fall, 
ceteris paribus.
The city is alien and different.  Many studies demonstrate the 
propensity of individuals to favor members of their own ethnic, racial, or 
tribal group and to discriminate against outsiders (Bernhard et al. 2006, 
Duggan 2006, Choi and Bowles 2007, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Putnam 
2007, Kristof 2008).  Trust and cooperation, this scholarship suggests, 
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flourish more in homogeneous than heterogeneous environments.  In many 
states, the populations of big cities look different from those in the rest of 
the state, not just larger—an emphasis of classic studies of the urban 
machine such as Bryce (1891) and Banfield and Wilson (1963)—and we 
hypothesize that this difference brings distinctive policy demands and may 
even breed hostility from outstate representatives.
We measure this difference, first, by calculating the number of foreign-
born people in each city relative to their proportion in the rest of the state.  
The data on nativity were gleaned directly from statewide census volumes 
for each of the years under study. The demographic divergence between 
states and their leading cities could be great: foreign-born whites made up 
30% of Chicago’s white population in 1920, but just 11% of the rest of the 
state’s white population, whereas modern-day Birmingham, like the rest of 
Alabama, is barely more than 1% foreign-born.  Figure 4 displays the 
demographic distances between metropolitan populations and states in 
1900, arraying states by the size of the gap between the state and the big 
city in their foreign-born populations.  This gap is small—and, we predict, big-
city passage rates should be relatively high—in low-immigrant states with 
low-immigrant cities, like Virginia (Richmond) and Alabama (Mobile) as well 
as in uniformly high-immigrant states such as Minnesota (Minneapolis) and 
Massachusetts (Boston).  By contrast, far more residents of Chicago and San 
Antonio were foreign-born than the residents of Illinois and Texas, 
respectively.  We expect that this demographic divide makes the jobs of 
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legislators from those cities especially difficult.  Thus we hypothesize that the
differences in nativity—between the relative numbers of foreign-born and 
native-born residents in the big city and rest of the state—will result in lower 
passage rates for big-city bills, since we expect difference to lead to 
animosity.2
To test another form of demographic difference, we calculate the 
number of African Americans in each city, again in proportion to the rest of 
the state.  While race is more salient than country of birth in defining 
difference in American society, we recognize that a simple count of numbers 
does not necessarily indicate political power.  African Americans were 
disfranchised in the South for most of the period of our study, and their 
numbers in most northern cities were relatively small.  Through the 1970s, 
the cities in our sample with the largest black populations were all located in 
the South—which was not a region where big-city representatives could be 
expected to represent black interests or, at least as important, be regarded 
by fellow legislators as tribunes for black interests.  In incorporating African-
American urban populations in our model, we consider the possibility that 
African-American populations matter only in the North and in the post-1965 
South and even the possibility that only after 1965 do they matter politically 
in state legislatures anywhere.  Separately, we identify every city in our 
sample with an African-American mayor to test the hypothesis that bills from
these cities might face greater hurdles to passage. 
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H3. As the proportion of foreign-born in a city’s population grows 
relative to that in the rest of the state’s population, passage 
rates of that city’s district bills will fall, ceteris paribus.
H4. As the proportion of African Americans in a city’s population 
grows relative to that in the rest of the state’s population, or in a 
city with an African-American mayor, passage rates of that city’s 
district bills will fall, ceteris paribus.
The city is harmed by party differences.  Perhaps partisan 
disagreements disrupt the system of logrolls that characterizes the general 
treatment of district bills.  Party tensions could emerge when the city’s 
delegation is itself divided along party lines.  They can also happen when the
party controlling the city opposes the party controlling the rest of the state 
(McGoldrick 1933, 2).  In New York, a Democratic city often confronted a 
hostile Republican state legislature, as Teaford (1984, 95) and Bridges 
(1984, 135) show, and Democrats in Chicago (Steiner and Gove 1960, 54) 
and Boston (Erie 1988, 204) also faced antagonism from Republicans hailing 
from other parts of the state.  Partisan differences can be vast.  In 1941, 
when 88% of Boston’s delegation was Democratic, 69% of the rest of the 
Massachusetts lower house was Republican.  We expect that party 
differences—measured either at the individual or the aggregate level—will 
depress passage rates of big-city bills.
H5. City bills introduced by a member of the legislative majority 
party will pass at higher rates than bills with a minority party 
author, ceteris paribus. 
H6. As majority party control of a city increases relative to the 
partisan legislative majority, passage rates of that city’s district 
bills rise, ceteris paribus.
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The city introduces too many bills.  Perhaps the high failure rates 
of big-city bills is a function not of hostility but instead of the logistical 
challenges of managing a large body of legislation.  In many cases, the 
largest cities make the greatest demands on the legislature, and the 
proliferation of bills from a great metropolis may itself be sufficient to 
undermine norms of deference to local legislation.  Rather than seeking 
approval for a handful of targeted district bills, representatives from the big 
city may find their energies spread among many different priorities.  At least 
at the extremes, in state legislatures with unusually high and low numbers of
bills to consider, passage rates are negatively correlated with workload 
(Squire and Moncrief 2010, 164).  In some states, the number of big-city bills 
is immense—in 1981 the New York legislature considered 612 bills from New 
York City—while in other states the burden is much smaller.  There were just 
21 Detroit bills in the 1941 Michigan session and 5 Omaha bills in the 1961 
Nebraska session.  The great variance among cities on this dimension allows 
us to test the proposition that the number of big-city bills is negatively 
correlated with passage rates.
H7. As the number of a city’s bills increases, passage rates fall, 
ceteris paribus.
Our Data: Tracking Bills through the Legislature
We draw in this article on an original sample of 1,736 district bills from 
cities large and small to show that big-city bills fail at higher rates than bills 
from smaller places, that the scale of a place affects legislative success.  
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These 1,736 bills come from our complete database of 165,284 bills, which 
include all bills introduced into the legislatures of thirteen different states—
Alabama, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New York, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington—at twenty-
year intervals, beginning in 1881 and extending through the 20th century.  
In selecting states, we sought to maximize variation along a variety of 
dimensions, while assembling a sample that is representative of the full fifty 
states.3  We intentionally overrepresented states with big cities, given the 
focus of this project, but we otherwise worked to include states from every 
region of the country and to study states that vary, historically and at 
present, on measures of urbanization, industrialization, legislative 
professionalism, careerism, and party structure.
Our data collection began by working with a team of other scholars 
and research assistants to study the subjects of all of the bills introduced in 
these sessions. (For a discussion of this process and levels of intercoder 
reliability, see Gamm and Kousser 2010, 158-161, 166-167.)  From each of 
ninety-one sessions, we tracked the full legislative histories4 of 50 bills—40 
chosen randomly from all bills introduced dealing with local affairs and 10 
additional bills (unless fewer than that number existed) dealing with the 
state’s biggest city.  Among the 40 bills selected from each session, most 
were not district bills: they affected all counties or towns in the state, not a 
specific county or town.  The 1,736 bills we analyze in the first empirical 
section of this article represent only the district bills in our database.  By 
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definition, these bills refer to a particular place in the state—perhaps a 
county, a city, a village, an area near a particular church or school, a judicial 
district, a business, even an individual with an address—and they were 
introduced by a member of the lower house representing that area.  
Omnibus appropriations bills do not appear in this database, but 
appropriations bills affecting a specific district are included alongside all 
other district bills. By presenting a model of passage rates for these 1,736 
bills, our first empirical section explores the impact of a city’s size on 
passage rates, controlling for a host of other factors that might account for 
the differing levels of legislative success by large and small cities.   
Of the 1,736 bills, we identified 747 that focus on the largest city in 
each state, and in the second part of our empirical analysis we draw on 
these 747 bills to evaluate our competing theories for why failure rates are 
related to city size. These cities differ dramatically in size and character, 
ranging from New York and Detroit to Omaha and Great Falls.  Included 
among these 747 bills are bills naming an area dominated by the state’s 
biggest city—such as counties (Chicago’s Cook County), authorities and 
commissions (Boston’s Metropolitan Park Commission), and geographic 
areas (Seattle’s Puget Sound)—as well as institutions located in the city, such
as UCLA or a corner barber shop in Richmond.  After tying each district bill to
a locality, we then collected comprehensive information on the localities 
themselves and on the people representing them in the state legislature. 
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Almost all the data we analyze come from original sources. We relied 
for our data on archives, legislative journals, and newspapers.  To identify 
legislators as rural, urban, or suburban, we studied census records and state-
specific sources to reconstruct metropolitan areas for each year in our study;
in metropolitan areas, we coded the large cities as “urban” and the 
remaining places as “suburban,” while, in the remainder of each state, 
medium-sized and large cities were “urban” and other places “rural.”  (Given
that legislative districts were difficult to reconstruct and often encompassed 
a range of localities, we coded each legislator as rural, urban, or suburban 
according to the location of their home address.)  Discovering serious 
inconsistencies in published records of session frequency and length, we 
collected all these data ourselves directly from legislative journals.
Analysis: Our Models and Findings
Using our dataset of 1,736 district bills drawn from jurisdictions large 
and small, we begin this section by exploring the argument that district bills 
from big cities fail at higher rates than other district bills.  In essence, our 
multivariate analysis takes a skeptical look at the performance gap identified
in Figure 1 to see if it truly reflects a bias against big cities, or if it can be 
explained away by other differences between these two types of bills.  As the
results in Table 1 will show, bills from larger cities indeed fare worse in state 
legislatures.  Next, we seek to explain why big city bills lose so often by 
turning to an analysis of the 747 bills on which we have collected richer data.
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We test Hypotheses 1-7 using these bills, finding strong support for the 
conjectures that cities with larger legislative delegations or more foreign 
populations fare most poorly in state capitols.   
Do Big Cities District Bills Really Fail at Higher Rates? 
While Figure 1 showed that bills from larger cities fare worse than 
those from smaller places, this apparent effect might be driven not by size 
but by other consequential differences between district bills from large and 
small cities.  It might reflect a simple reaction against bills emanating from a 
state’s largest city, no matter whether it was a major metropolis or not.  
Second, it could be driven by variation in the content of legislation.  Finally, 
big-city bills may lose more often if they are more likely to be authored by 
members of the minority party or geographic faction in a statehouse.  We 
outline each of these three alternative explanations of the pattern shown in 
Figure 1 and propose empirical measures (listed in bold) to capture the 
causal factors they identify.  Our multivariate model, which draws on our full 
set of 1,736 district bills, allows us to control for them and to hold constant 
other variables in order to isolate the impact of a city’s population.
The first alternative explanation that we consider is that the poor 
performance of bills from big cities could be explained by a crude bias 
against the biggest city in each state.  The city that looms the largest in a 
statehouse may stir resentment, even if it is relatively small in a national 
context.  We take this into account by including in our analysis a dummy 
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variable indicating that a bill comes from a state’s largest city in a given 
session.  Importantly, this variable does not perfectly correlate with city 
population.  After all, in some states, like Vermont and Montana, even the 
largest city is little more than a small town.  By contrast, San Francisco (from
1921 onwards), Los Angeles (before 1921), Dallas, St. Paul, and Buffalo are 
very large cities that do not rank as the largest in their state.  This creates a 
divergence that allows us to distinguish between the effects of being a 
state’s biggest city and a pure population effect.
Second, big-city bills may differ in some qualitative way from bills 
affecting smaller cities and towns.  The needs of large cities are different not 
only in scale, but in substance, from those of other places.  Until recent 
decades, every large city supported large manufacturing centers and 
depended on a complex web of rail lines, ports, and power supplies to allow 
these industries to flourish.  Large cities have also attracted great 
concentrations of people, requiring water and sewage lines on a scale 
unknown to the ordinary city or town in a state, as well as sophisticated 
systems of mass transit.  Perhaps, then, the largest city in each state has 
historically sought bills that were substantively different from those sought 
by other localities, and perhaps this difference in bill content explains the 
high failure rate of bills from the biggest cities.  To test this hypothesis, we 
analyze the content of bills introduced into the various state legislatures, 
distinguishing the bills from the biggest cities from all other district bills.  The
online Appendix Table A1 lays out the categories that we developed to 
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categorize each bill’s content.  We constructed seventeen categories, read 
descriptions of each bill, then identified its bill content according to one of 
these categories.  As online Appendix Figure A2 shows, we discover marked 
similarities between the full set of district bills and the subsample of bills 
from the biggest cities.  The poor performance of cities in these legislatures 
does not appear to be a product of differences in the substance of these bills,
because these is little difference on average between the types of bills 
emanating from large and small cities.  Still, to account for the impact that 
bill content may have on any individual piece of legislation, we include 
indicators for these content categories in our multivariate analysis. 
 The third alternative explanation we consider is that bills from the 
biggest cities fail because their representatives are distinctive in some 
fashion.  Here we explore two possibilities: that the big-city representative 
introducing the bill is in the minority party or in the minority geographic 
faction.  While in the next section of this article, using our smaller sample of
bills, we analyze the impact of minority status on legislative success, in this 
section we consider the impact of this same factor in our full dataset of 1,736
district bills.  Our strong prior assumption is that members of the majority 
party will give deference to each other’s district bills, because they have 
little to gain by taking away the electoral tools of their co-partisans.  By 
contrast, if they block district bills authored by members of the minority 
party, they could secure an electoral benefit for their party’s challengers for 
these seats.  If this logic prevails, majority status will lead to higher passage 
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rates.  Historically, many states have been fractured more by geographic 
differences than by partisan splits, so we also look at geographic factions to 
test the possibility that the identity of the person introducing the bill explains
success or failure.  Because geography creates a salient division within many
legislatures, we expect that members of the largest geographic faction—
urban, suburban, or rural—will discriminate against district bills introduced 
by their rivals for the same reason that the majority party might wish to 
block the minority.  In order to test these two hypotheses, we used party 
rosters and information on district geography gleaned from an array of 
archival sources to code the introducer’s party (and faction), determine 
which party (and faction) controlled the lower house of the legislature, and 
then identify whether the introducer is in the majority or minority party (and 
faction).
Our multivariate models include other characteristics of the states and 
sessions in which these district bills were introduced.  Prior research (Gamm 
and Kousser 2008) explores the causal linkages between these factors and 
the fate of all types of district bills in greater depth; here, we treat them as 
controls to be held constant.  Chief among these are measures of the 
homogeneity of the legislature in partisan and geographic terms, and of the 
state in racial terms.  Our analysis of all district bills found that they pass at 
sharply higher rates as the majority party’s margin of control grows, with 
deference prevailing in one-party legislatures but collapsing when the parties
are divided evenly.  We also found that increases in the share of seats 
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held by minor parties, another mark of division, lower passage rates.  We 
use our partisan categorization of individual legislators to construct these 
aggregate measures.  We also use our geographic coding of legislators to 
include the share of seats held by suburban members.5  We draw on 
Census Bureau figures to measure the percentage of the state 
population that is African-American in each year, since many state 
studies have found that diversity leads to more conservative policy outputs 
(Plotnick and Winters 1985; Kronebusch 1993; Grogan 1994).  To test the 
hypothesis that patterns of mutual deference collapse when legislative time 
horizons are shortened—an idea suggested by Axelrod and Hamilton’s 
(1981) finding that cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games can be 
achieved when play is repeated—we include the level of legislative 
turnover (taken from Burns et al. 2008, Table 1a) in our models. We control 
for the total number of bills introduced in a session, gathered from 
legislative archives, to account for the possibility that legislators forced to 
deal with many bills in a session will have less time to scrutinize each of 
them and be more likely to pass them all.  We also control for the length of 
a legislative session, measured in legislative days using the archival 
sources first documented in the appendix to Gamm and Kousser (2007), as 
well as legislative salaries as measured in proportion to state per capita 
incomes in Burns et al. (2008, Table 4), expecting that more professional 
legislatures may have the time to pass more district bills of all types.  Finally,
we control for whether or not a state grants broad home rule powers to its 
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cities (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2000) as well as the level of malapportionment, 
measured by the ratio of the least populous counties’ voting power in the 
legislature divided by the power held by a state’s biggest counties, averaged
across a state’s two houses in 1910 and calculated by David and Eisenberg 
(1961, 15).  Our expectations are that cities granted home rule will only 
come to the legislature with their more complex problems, and thus fare 
worse than cities without home rule, and that malapportionment should hurt 
big cities.
Table 1 reports the results of a logit model on our full sample of 1,736 
district bills predicting whether a bill passes out of the lower house or fails at 
any prior point in the process. (In online Appendix Table A2, we report very 
similar results from a parallel model explaining whether each bill became 
law.)  Because the explanatory variables are measured at different levels—a 
bill’s authorship, its content, and city size at the level of an individual bill, the
legislature’s party structure and other characteristics at the level of a 
legislative session—we use multilevel modeling techniques to acknowledge 
this data structure explicitly.  Each bill is nested within the environment of a 
legislative session and is subject to the same subtle and unmeasured forces 
that affect other bills in the same session.  We thus include random effects 
for the 87 sessions that we analyze here,6 as well as state and year fixed 
effects to recognize the other hierarchies and potential for autocorrelation in 
our dataset and estimate the model using the GLLAMM program (Rabe-
Hesketh et al. 2004) in Stata 11.0.                            
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The results of this estimation show that the performance gap between 
legislation from big and small cities, which is so clear in Figure 1, remains 
strong and significant when we hold constant three alternative explanations 
of this gap, along with variables capturing the systematic and idiosyncratic 
features of legislative sessions.  Leaving the 513 bills from counties and 
other localities as the reference category, we look at how bills from cities of 
different sizes—whether or not they happen to be the biggest city in a state
—fare.  Bills from cities with populations below 10,000 or between 10,000 
and 100,000 residents do just as well as district bills from counties, the 
insignificant coefficients show.  But bills from cities with more than 100,000 
residents do much worse.7  The coefficient on this category is negative and 
significant at the 99% confidence level.  One way to get a sense of the 
substantive scale of this effect is to calculate an odds ratio, which reports the
factor by which a one-unit increase in an independent variable either boosts 
or lowers the legislation’s chances of passage.8  The odds ratio for the “City 
over 100,000 Residents” indicator variable is 0.29, showing that bills from 
any city of this size are less than a third as likely to pass as bills from small 
cities or counties, all else equal.  Perhaps paradoxically, but confirming the 
contention of a long literature in urban politics, major metropolises really do 
lose more often in state capitols when it comes to district bills. 
Other results of our model reveal additional intriguing patterns.  The 
insignificant coefficient on our indicator that a bill is from the state’s biggest 
city shows that, for cities of a given size, a predominant position in a state 
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poses no additional penalty.  Bills from Burlington, the largest city in 
Vermont, do just as well as bills from other small cities, and bills from 
Houston (Texas’s biggest city in the modern era) do no worse than bills from 
its rival city of Dallas.  It is population size itself that matters.  Using our 
measures of the policy areas addressed by each piece of legislation shows 
that some aspects of bill content matter.  Bills giving power to a locality pass
at higher rates, while bills sending resources either down to the city or 
county or back up to the state pass much less often.  Still, because bills from 
states’ biggest cities propose the same sorts of policies contained in other 
district bills—as online Appendix Figure A2 shows—holding constant the 
content of these bills does not explain away the big-city effect.
Neither does controlling for who introduces them.  Surprisingly, district 
bills authored by a member of the legislature’s majority party do no better 
than bills with a minority-party author.9  While one might expect the party 
cue to be powerful, this finding shows that the rule of universalism applies to
district legislation in the states much as it does to district spending in the 
U.S. Congress (Schattschneider 1935, Fenno 1966, Ferejohn 1974).  
Similarly, bills authored by a member of the state’s largest geographic group
do no better, on average, than bills that come from other geographic 
factions, an additional form of universalism.  Looking at the other control 
variables, we see that, consistent with earlier work on a more limited sample
of district bills (Gamm and Kousser 2008), district legislation is more likely to 
win when one party or geographic faction (urban, rural, or suburban) 
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dominates a house, but lose more often when the percentage of seats held 
by minor parties rises.  Other factors, such as the suburban seat share, the 
racial diversity of a state’s population, legislative professionalism, 
membership turnover, home rule, and malapportionment, do not seem to 
matter.  The primary lesson of this analysis is that the gap in performance 
between big-city bills and other district legislation displayed in Figure 1 
persists, even with a myriad of controls in place.    
Why Do Big-City Bills Fail So Often?  
Now that we have shown that district bills from cities with larger 
populations fare worse—and that there is nothing distinctive about the 
largest city in a state—we ask why big-city bills fail at these high rates, 
drawing on our subsample of 747 bills.  This sample provides the wide 
variation is population size, levels of representation in the statehouse, 
demographics, and partisan control that we need in order to test Hypotheses
H1-H7.  To perform this analysis, we estimate the same sorts of multilevel 
models of house passage that we did in the prior section, and report a 
parallel model predicting whether a bill became law in online Appendix Table
A2.  Again, the model includes state and year fixed effects, session-level 
random effects,10 measures of bill content, and a host of substantive control 
variables. 
The results reported in Table 2 present a clear explanation of why 
district bills from cities like New York, Chicago, and Detroit fare so poorly: 
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legislation from a city is more likely to lose when that city’s legislative 
delegation is large, and when the city houses many more immigrants than 
the state.  The first result strongly confirms Hypothesis H1.  The first row in 
the table reports a negative coefficient on the (logged) delegation size that is
significant at the 99% confidence level.  It not driven by an outlier; this 
finding is robust to the exclusion of any of the cities in our dataset.  One way 
to get a sense of the magnitude of this effect is to see how increases in the 
size of a city delegation change the predicted probability of a district bill’s 
passage in a typical session.11  Figure 5 presents these effects graphically, 
across the full range of variation in delegation sizes in our sample.  It shows 
that when only one legislator represents a city, a typical district bill is likely 
to pass 80% of the time.  Yet when the delegation size increases to two 
members, allowing the possibility of internal disagreement, the predicted 
probability of passage declines sharply to 64%, then falls again to 53% with 
a delegation size of three.  Passage rates continue to drop off as delegation 
size increases all the way to its maximum value in our data (the 69 house 
members representing Chicago in 1961).  Yet the declines are steepest 
moving from one legislator to a handful, holding all other factors equal.    
Our multivariate finding is buttressed by a look at the impact of the 
reapportionment revolution on a state-by-state basis.  Reapportionment 
brought an exogenous shift in delegation size, holding population largely 
constant, and all of the cities that saw their delegation sizes jump between 
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1960 and 1980 also saw their legislative success plummet over that time 
period.12    
What logic drives this result?  We showed, in Figure 3 above, that 
bigger delegations create more opportunity for internal division, and that 
internal division leads to legislative defeat.  The tight link between 
delegation size and passage rates buttresses that argument.  It also 
suggests an answer to the puzzle of why, even after the reapportionment 
revolution, bills from big cities continue to lose more often than other district
bills. While the elimination of malapportionment gave big cities and other 
urban areas greater representation, it also saddled them with more 
representatives and thus increased the chances that they might be internally
divided.  Bigger delegations may have been more likely to split on city bills 
than in the past, when only one or a handful of legislators represented the 
area, and this may explain why their district bills fared so poorly in the 1981 
and 1997 sessions.   
Delegation size appears to be the main avenue through which large 
populations hurt big-city bills.  We find no support for Hypothesis H2.  
Controlling for delegation size, cities that make up a larger share of the 
state’s population do no worse than cities that are relatively smaller.  We 
also include a dummy variable indicating that the state had a rival big city in 
that era, coded as “1” if the state’s second largest city was both among the 
nation’s 100 largest cities in the prior census and at least half the size of the 
state’s biggest city.  This variable’s impact also falls well short of 
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significance, showing that Houston is not harmed by the presence of Dallas 
or Minneapolis by St. Paul.  Rivalries over population size alone do not 
appear to drive the failure of big-city bills; delegation size creates weakness 
in numbers.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit that demographic differences galvanize 
hostility to cities: the larger the difference between the populations of a 
state’s biggest city and the state itself, either in immigration patterns or in 
race, the greater the hostility.  We find evidence that district bills lose at 
higher rates when they emerge from cities with more foreign-born residents 
relative to the state.  This effect is statistically significant and substantively 
strong.  Figure 6 displays its magnitude, again holding all other explanatory 
variables constant at their mean (for continuous) or median (for 
dichotomous) values.  It shows that a bill from a city that actually had a 
smaller proportion of immigrants in its population than the state did—as was 
the case in Minnesota in 1881, where the difference in proportions was 2.3 
percentage points—would pass 23% of the time.  By contrast, in the situation
where the city is much more immigrant-rich than the state—as in Illinois in 
1881, where there was a 21.8 percentage point difference between 
Chicago’s immigrant proportion and the state’s—our model produces a 
predicted probability of passage of only 2%.  (Each of these baseline 
probabilities of passage is relatively low because we hold the city’s 
delegation size constant at its mean value, which is 19 in our sample, thus 
predicting low passage rates regardless of demographic factors.)  This helps 
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to explain why bills from cities such as New York and Chicago, hubs of 
immigration relative to the rest of their states, fare more poorly than bills 
from cities like Richmond and Minneapolis, which are microcosms of their 
states.
A parallel measure of racial difference, however, exerts no such effect, 
yielding a coefficient that is far from statistically significant.  We have also 
sought to capture racial prejudice by coding a variable indicating that the 
city had an African-American mayor, but this factor is similarly insignificant 
(and even when we remove the mayoral variable from our model, the 
measure of racial demographic difference still falls well short of significance).
In models not reported here, we probed for other potential impacts of race or
ethnicity,13 but found no evidence that it was an important obstacle to big-
city success in our sample over this time period. In addition to testing for an 
effect of differences between city and state black populations, we 
(separately) tested for the impact of racial diversity in the city and in the 
state.  We also tested each effect in constrained contexts—after the civil 
rights era (our 1981 and 1997 sessions), or in the subset of our cases where 
blacks had effective suffrage (in the South after the civil rights era and in 
other regions in all years).  In none of these models was any measure of 
black population statistically significant.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 also yield null findings.  The presence of partisan 
divides between metropolitan delegations and the legislature as a whole 
does not seem to lead to district bill defeats.  This is the case whether 
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partisan difference is measured at the individual or the aggregate level.  Just 
as we saw in our analysis of all district bills, legislation from the biggest city 
authored by majority party members does not pass at significantly higher 
rates than bills introduced by minority party legislators.  Neither do bills 
emerging from cities with delegations controlled by the same party that 
controls the legislature.  States appear to practice universalism in this 
sphere, just as they do in distributive politics at the federal level.  Finally, we 
see no evidence in favor of Hypothesis 7: the fates of individual district bills 
are not affected by the aggregate number of bills introduced by a city 
delegation. 
Overall, the major lessons of this analysis are that cities lose in the 
statehouse when their residents appear foreign to other state legislators and 
when their delegations are too large to speak with a unanimous voice.  
Although we lack a direct measure of ethnic animus, nativism may be 
relevant to understanding the lower passage rates of big-city bills.  But other
measures of hostility—party divisions, bills introduced by members of the 
minority political party, large African-American populations, many rural 
legislators—have no effect on passage rates.  Large numbers of observers 
have pointed to partisan divides between big cities and their states, and 
many others have focused on rural-urban cleavages, but the evidence we 
present in this article leads us to reject both sets of explanations.  Instead we
embrace the finding that deference, rather than antagonism, characterizes 
the treatment of district bills.  That big-city bills fail in such large numbers is 
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due, above all, to large delegation sizes.  Division within big-city delegations 
is the central variable explaining low passage rates.
Discussion
Our research began with a paradox: there is strength in numbers in 
many political realms, with more representation leading to a greater share of
goods, while a long literature in American politics has found that this pattern 
is reversed when it comes to big cities.  We show that larger cities in fact do 
much worse than smaller ones in a critical area of state politics, passing the 
district legislation needed to govern localities.  The bigger the city, the more 
often the district bills authored by its legislative delegation lose, a finding 
that is not an artifact of the content of these bills or the party affiliation of 
their author.  Over more than a century’s time, the passage rates of district 
bills from cities with over 100,000 residents lag 24% to 34% behind the 
success rates of district bills overall, a pattern that remains strong in a 
multivariate analysis of 1,736 bills.
We explain this paradox by examining a subsample of 747 bills from 
each state’s largest cities, which vary widely in their populations, political 
representation, and demographics.  We find that scale exerts its most 
dramatic effect through the size of big-city delegations.  Larger delegations 
are more likely to be divided along partisan lines and to split over roll-call 
votes on their own district bills.  Following Kingdon’s (1973) logic, it appears, 
legislators from the rest of the state follow the cues of the big-city delegation
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and split when its members divide, often dooming bills.  The larger a city’s 
delegation grows, the worse the prospects of its district bills become, 
providing an explanation of why the reapportionment revolution did not 
solve the problems of big-city legislation.  The other factor that harms large 
cities is the demographic difference between their populations and the rest 
of the state.  A sharper demographic divide between a city and the state in 
immigrant population percentages hurts the prospects of city legislation.  We
do not find a parallel effect of racial divides, but this may be because blacks 
were either absent from large cities or effectively disfranchised in much of 
this time period and thus not strongly associated with big-city legislators.  
It is important to note that our focus on the treatment of district bills 
does not tell the full story of how cities are treated in statehouses; cities can 
win or lose in other arenas of state politics.  When it comes to grants that 
states make to local governments, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008) show 
that urban centers lost out on public spending before the reapportionment 
revolution but that the one-person, one-vote decisions largely removed this 
inequity.  Of equal or greater import might be policies such as state welfare 
and health care spending that disproportionately benefit urban populations 
in many states, or direct state spending on projects and services directed to 
local areas (such as roads, ports, bridges, unemployment offices, and even 
universities).  Larger cities may have more sway than small towns over these
consequential decisions, and future research could draw important lessons 
by studying the geographic distribution of state budgets to chart who gets 
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what, when, and how from statehouses.
Other work remains to be done.  Race could matter more today than in
our largely historical dataset, and we are gathering another round of recent 
data to further explore this dynamic.  The new wave of immigration from 
Latin America and Asian nations could drive another wedge of demographic 
difference between cities and states based on ethnicity that deserves further
exploration.  Rodden’s work (2012) on the industrial roots of urban liberalism
and its interaction with electoral institutions also suggests new avenues for 
research in states, with their variance in levels of industrialization as well as 
some multimember legislative districts.
Still, this article demonstrates—for the first time in a systematic, data-
driven study—that big-city lawmakers get less of what they want in state 
legislatures, when it comes to bills governing their own districts.  There is no 
strength in numbers.  Delegation size brings division and conflict, as do 
demographic differences between city residents and those in the rest of the 
state.  This explains why the reapportionment revolution did not increase the
power of big cities in this realm and why metropolitan growth, especially if it 
is driven by immigration, can leave big cities particularly disadvantaged in 
statehouses.  When it comes to passing district bills sought by American 
cities, increasing representation is no solution at all.
Figure 1.  Comparing Passage Rates of Big-City vs. Other District 
Bills, over Time
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Notes: The data for this figure are drawn directly from the legislative journals
of Alabama, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
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Notes: Roll-call analysis based on 163 bills that came up for a roll-call vote; 
all other analyses based on the full sample of 747 district bills from the 
biggest city in each state.  The “Largest Party Share of Biggest-City 
Delegation” reports the share of seats in the city’s legislative delegation that
is held by the largest faction in that delegation (either the Republican Party, 
the Democratic Party, or a third party).
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Figure 5. Substantive Impact of City Delegation Size on Passage 
Rates, using the Subsample with Richer Data





































Figure 6. Substantive Impact of Foreign-Born Population on Passage
Rates, using the Subsample with Richer Data





































City under 10,000 Residents .08 (.20)
City between 10,000 and 100,000 
Residents
.11 (.22)
City over 100,000 Residents -1.24** (.30) 0.29
Bill is from the State’s Biggest City .25 (.25)
Bill Content
Approval of Local Action .78 (.52)
Exercise of State Power .05 (.14)
Power Reclaimed by State -.28 (.70)
Power to Local Unit .35* (.17) 1.42
Create or Abolish Unit -.05 (.17)
Transfer of Power Between Units -.99 (.96)
Resources to Local Unit -.78** (.20) 0.46
State Reclaims Resources -2.66* (1.13) 0.07
Transfers Resources Between Units .42 (.50)
Author Characteristics
Majority Party Author .12 (.14)
Largest Geographic Group -.10 (.13)
Legislative and State Context
Size of Majority Party Margin .02** (.004) 1.02
Minor Party Seat Share -.12** (.03) .89
Size of Urban-Rural Margin .016* (.006) 1.02
Suburban Seat Share -.02 (.02)
Black % of Population -.04 (.03)
Turnover of Membership -.01 (.01)
Total Bill Introductions (1000s) -.15 (.09)
Session Length .001 (.003)
Legislative Salaries .05 (.13)
Home Rule Provision .04 (.34)
Malapportionment Ratio .06 (.07)
State Fixed Effects included
Year Fixed Effects included
State-Year Random Effects included
-2 X Log Likelihood 2029.72
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Notes: N=1736.  Table entries are estimated coefficients and (standard 
errors) from models with random coefficients for each legislative session, 
estimated using GLLAMM in Stata 1.0. * = p < .05,  and **= p < .01 in two-
tailed tests







Size of the City
(H1) Seats in the City Delegation (ln) -1.57** (.38) .21
(H2) Size of the City as % of State .02 (.03)
Demographic Differences
(H3) Foreign-Born % City Residents Minus 
State % 
-.13* (.06) .88




(H5) Majority Party Author .11 (.23)
(H6) % of City Delegation from Leg.’s 
Largest Party
-.01 (.01)
Legislative and State Context
(H7) # of City Bills Introduced -.003 (.002)
Big City Mayor is African-American -.57 (0.73)
State Has a Second Major City .05 (0.57)
Size of Majority Party Margin .01 (.01)
Minor Party Seat Share -.14 (.08)
Size of Urban-Rural Margin .01 (.01)
Suburban Seat Share -.07** (.03) .93
Turnover of Membership -.03* (.01) .97
Total Bill Introductions (1000s) -.06 (.13)
Session Length -.002 (.003)
Legislative Salaries .16 (.17)
Home Rule Provision -1.49** (.43) .22
Malapportionment Ratio .05 (.12)
Bill Content Variables included
State Fixed Effects included
Year Fixed Effects included
State-Year Random Effects included
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-2 X Log Likelihood 817.14
Notes: N=747. Table entries are estimated coefficients and (standard errors) 
from models with random coefficients for each legislative session, estimated 
using GLLAMM in Stata 11.0. * = p < .05,  and **= p < .01 in two-tailed tests.
This model includes all of the bill content categories show in Table 1, but we 
do not report coefficients for the sake of clear exposition.  
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1 Notably, nothing in this earlier scholarship contradicts the fact that big-city 
bills passed at lower rates than other district bills, but this fact goes 
unmentioned in the text even when it is latent in the analysis.  Burns et al. 
(2009) restrict their study to bills affecting the biggest city in each state; while 
they find, as we do, that large delegation sizes undermine a city’s legislative 
success, their emphasis is on the ways in which “the city delegation . . . has 
tremendous power to manage the state’s involvement in city affairs” (Burns et 
al. 2009, 1, also 19, 20).  They do not report the fact that big cities, as a group, 
fare much worse than smaller places in state legislatures.  Allard et al. (1998, 
281), drawing on a small sample of the states and sessions we analyze here, do
document the low passage rates of big-city bills in Table 4.  In all four 
quadrants of the table, and in every stage of the legislative process, big-city 
bills (i.e., “dominant-city bills”) fare much worse than other district bills (i.e., 
“other special bills”).  But this aspect of Table 4 is never discussed in the 
article; nowhere in the text is attention drawn to this evidence of 
discrimination.  Rather, Allard et al. (1998) utilize this table only to present 
evidence consistent with patterns of deference to big cities.  Thus this article 
points out that big-city bills fared at least as well in committees dominated by 
non-urban members as in urban committees, both before and after the 
adoption of home rule. 
2 We cannot prove that lower passage rates are due to animosity without 
gathering more evidence regarding the motives of legislators.  However, since 
we have constructed this variable to be the relative proportions of immigrants 
in the populations of the city and its state—not a simple measure of the 
number of immigrants in the city’s population without relation to the rest of the
state—the variable is consistent with hostility as an explanation.  An alternate 
hypothesis, that a large urban immigrant population would contribute to 
division within the city delegation, would be logical if our findings related to the
total number of immigrants in a city rather than to city-state differences on this
dimension.  In an analysis not reported here, we tested this alternative 
hypothesis directly by including a variable measuring the foreign-born 
population of the city itself in the model presented in Table 2.  The estimated 
coefficient of this variable was not statistically significant, and in fact the 
coefficient of our measure of city-state demographic differences grew in scale 
and statistical significance when the new measure was included.
3 In the most recent year of our dataset, 1997, these thirteen states mirrored 
the nation in key state and legislative characteristics: a. income per capita 
($28,961 compared with $27,500 in the nation as a whole), b. Democratic 
share of legislative seats (53.76% compared with 51.41%), c. Squire’s index of 
legislative professionalism (.26 compared with .18), and Lax and Phillips’s 
(2009) measure of ideology (-12.42 compared with -13.64).  Only the difference
in Squire’s professionalism index was statistically significant, and this is a 
difference that emerges primarily toward the end of our period of study after 
the professionalization movement of the 1960s. The main way that these 
states differ is in their population size, since we purposefully sampled the 
nation’s three biggest states: California, New York, and Texas.
4 In many cases, bills changed identity as they passed through the legislature.  
When a bill was formally renumbered, or when a group of bills were explicitly 
merged together, we continued following the new bill through the legislature; if
the new bill was passed, we coded the original bill as having passed the 
chamber. 
5 Houses that contain more members from suburban rather than rural areas 
could provide a source of natural allies for big-city legislators, giving them 
coalition partners to help them pass the sorts of bills—like the creation of a 
public transportation system—that benefit an entire metropolitan area.  Yet 
suburban lawmakers might just as easily be natural enemies to big city 
legislators if the bills they introduce—such as the commuter tax that New York 
City mayor Michael Bloomberg pushed in Albany in 2007—are seen as inimical 
to suburban interests.  This is an empirical question that we put to our dataset. 
6 Although our dataset could potentially have drawn on bills from 91 sessions, 
we could locate no informal party affiliations of the nonpartisan legislators from
Nebraska in 1941, 1961, and 1981, and thus excluded big city bills in these 
sessions from our analysis.  Montana’s session in 1997 is also omitted from the 
analysis, because it produced no district legislation.    
7 In a model not reported here, we included a continuous measure of city 
population, and found the same substantive effects: passage rates fall as city 
size increases.  We do not report this model, however, because we lack 
population data on bills affecting counties and other localities, such as judicial 
districts and transportation corridors, that are more difficult to measure 
exactly.
8 For instance, an odds ratio of 2 would indicate that a one unit rise in the 
variable doubles the bill’s chances of passing. An odds ratio above 1 indicates 
that increases in an explanatory factor will boost passage rates, while a ratio 
below 1 means that increases in the variable lower a bill’s odds of passage.
9 This finding holds true even when we separately analyze the impact of the 
author’s party in more recent times (from 1960 onward and from 1980 
onward), when one might expect partisan lines to harden.  In models not 
reported here, we find no evidence that majority party authors pass more bills 
in any era.  
10 We have data from 77 legislative sessions.  We again lack full data from the 
non-partisan Nebraska legislatures of 1941-1981, as well as data from that 
sessions that produced no district bills from the state’s largest city: Montana in 
1901-1997, Texas in 1881-1941, and Washington in 1881.
11 We hold all continuous independent variables constant at their means and all
dichotomous independent variables constant at their median values and, to 
capture a session in the middle of our sample, use the baseline passage rate in
the state of Nebraska in 1920.
12 In our sample, four cities saw a steep rise in delegation size after the one-
person, one-vote decisions.  Birmingham, Alabama’s delegation rose from five 
members to 14 from 1960 to 1980, and it went from passing seven of its eight 
district bills in 1960 to seeing all 13 of the district bills authored by its 
delegation fail in 1980. Omaha’s delegation rose from seven to 13 members, 
and its passage rate went from 66% to 0%.  Houston’s delegation increased 
from 8 seats to 21, and its passage rate fell from 64% to 11%.  Burlington’s 
delegation rose from one seat to 12, while it went from passing all four of its 
district bills to seeing both of the district bills from its delegation fail.     
13 We could not test the impact of Hispanic ethnicity across our dataset, 
because the Census did not consistently ask Americans to report Hispanic 
ethnicity until 1970.  For cities such as Burlington, Vermont, measuring this 
demographic simply is not an issue.  But it could matter in other places, and in 
this exploratory bivariate analysis we focus on three states where there has 
likely been a significant rise in the big city Hispanic population, relative to the 
state: Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston.  In each, we compare the passage 
rates of district bills from the state’s largest city in the 1941 and 1961 sessions,
before the major demographic transition took place, to passage rates in 1981 
and 1997.  If the rising Latino population in metropolitan areas caused big city 
bills to be treated less favorably in the legislature, we should see a drop in 
passage rates between these two eras.  The data suggest that ethnicity could 
indeed be important, though the pattern is not universal.  In two of the cities, 
there is indeed a sharp decline.  In Texas, passage rates of bills from Houston 
drop from an average of 64% in the 1941 and 1961 sessions to 21% in the 
1981 and 1997 sessions combined.  In Illinois, passage rates of Chicago bills 
drop from 57% to 23% over the same era.  Yet in California, passage rates of 
Los Angeles bills rise from 47% in the earlier decades to 70% in recent ones.   
